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 Abstract 
 
 
This paper examines the extent to which racial and ethnic disparities exist in the 
implementation of California’s “Three Strikes and You’re Out” law.  The analysis then examines 
whether racial and ethnic disparities vary by type of offense.  Logistic regression analysis of 
individual-level data on over 171,000 California prison inmates indicates that African-Americans 
are more likely than whites and Latinos to receive third-strike sentences, even when legally 
relevant variables are controlled.  The analysis also finds that Latino defendants are significantly 
less likely to receive third-strike sentences.  The analysis finds that the black-white gap is greater 
for offenses known as “wobblers,” which can be filed as either felonies or misdemeanors (i.e. 
offenses for which prosecutors have greater discretion in the charging decision), than for 
offenses that must always be charged as felonies.  Racial disparities are also greater for property 
and drug offenses than for violent crimes.   
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The Liberation Hypothesis and Racial and Ethnic Disparities 
in the Application of California’s Three Strikes Law1 
 
 
Introduction, Background, and Hypotheses 
 
Criminal sentencing laws are usually enacted at the state or national level, but the 
implementation of most policies takes place at the local level of government.  For example, 
California’s “Three Strikes and You’re Out” law is implemented in large part by district 
attorneys and judges, elected county officials whose practices and policies may reflect the 
attitudes of the constituencies that voted them into office.  Mandatory sentencing laws like 
“Three Strikes” are designed to limit the degree of discretion that decision-makers in the criminal 
justice system are permitted to exercise.  However, some flexibility exists in the law’s 
implementation.  Prosecutors can move to dismiss prior convictions that might count as strikes, 
“in the furtherance of justice.”  According to the “letter of the law,” any offender who has two or 
more serious or violent “strikes” shall face a mandatory sentence of twenty-five years to life in 
prison for any subsequent felony conviction regardless of the severity of the current offense, but 
in some counties, prosecutors do not initiate Three Strikes proceedings unless the new conviction 
is for a serious or violent offense.  Discretion is exercised by prosecutors in the case filing 
decision: for certain offenses, known as “wobblers,” the prosecutor must decide whether to 
charge the crime as a felony (which, upon conviction, would include a prison term and trigger a 
second- or third-strike sentence for a defendant with one or more prior serious or violent 
convictions) or a misdemeanor (which would not).  Prosecutors and judges may also reduce prior 
convictions for “wobbler” offenses from felonies to misdemeanors retroactively, or charge single 
or multiple counts, one or more of which may be strikes, from a single incident.  District 
Attorneys retain the authority to craft internal policies regarding how the Three Strikes law is 
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applied.  A central question in the current investigation is whether this discretion is exercised to 
the advantage or disadvantage of certain racial or ethnic groups. 
This paper investigates this question empirically, using a previously unavailable dataset 
containing individual-level records for over 171,000 inmates in the California prison system.  
Logistic regression models are designed to measure the extent of racial and ethnic disparity in 
the Three Strikes sentencing process, when demographic characteristics and legally relevant 
variables, including conviction offense, prior record, and parole status are held constant.  The 
analysis finds that some, but not all, of the observed racial/ethnic disparities can be explained by 
these factors, and that African-Americans fare much worse than whites, even when demographic 
and legal factors are controlled.  It is also clear that prosecutorial or judicial discretion is 
exercised, particularly for less serious offenses.  The analysis finds that this disadvantages 
African-Americans, but it seems to work in Latino and immigrant offenders’ favor. 
Background on Implementation and Impacts of “Three Strikes” and Mandatory 
Minimum Sentencing Laws 
 
In 1994, at the height of a national movement to “get tough on crime,” the “Three Strikes 
and You’re Out” law passed in California by ballot initiative with 72 percent public support, and 
was confirmed by the state legislature.  “Three Strikes” has two main components: first, if a 
defendant has a prior conviction for a serious or violent offense (i.e. a “strike”) and is convicted 
of a subsequent felony, the sentence for the current felony conviction is automatically doubled.  
This is referred to as the law’s “second strike” provision.  Second, if a defendant has two or more 
prior serious or violent felony convictions, as specified in California penal code sections 667.5(c) 
and 1192.7(c), any subsequent felony conviction carries a mandatory “third-strike” sentence of 
25 years to life in prison (Ricciardulli, 2002).2  Three Strikes has ardent supporters along with 
vehement critics, and the latter group includes many who believe that the law is applied 
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disproportionately against African-Americans and Latinos (Ehlers, Schiraldi, & Lotke, 2004; 
Families to Amend California's Three Strikes, 2006).   
Indeed, African-Americans are heavily overrepresented among second- and third-strike 
inmates.  As shown in Table 1, they make up about 35 percent of second-strikers and 45 percent 
of third-strikers among California prison inmates, despite the fact that African-Americans 
constitute only slightly more than 6 percent of California’s adult population (California 
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 2005; United States Census Bureau Population 
Division, 2004).  Whites, on the other hand, make up over half of the California adult population 
but only about one-quarter of second- and third-strike inmates (California Department of 
Corrections and Rehabilitation, 2005; United States Census Bureau Population Division, 2004).  
Relative to their share of the adult population, Latino inmates are overrepresented among 
second-strike inmates, but underrepresented among third-strikers.  However, these patterns of 
over- and underrepresentation do not necessarily indicate that discrimination is present; they may 
be due to variation among groups in eligibility for “strikes” sentences.  This study investigates 
the extent to which “legally relevant” variables such as the defendants’ offenses and criminal 
records explain intergroup differences in second- and third-strike sentences, and if not, whether 
the degree of prosecutorial discretion given to prosecutors is associated with the disparities. 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Theoretical Frameworks: Focal Concerns Theory and Liberation Hypothesis 
 The discussion of whether and how race influences sentencing has spanned more than 
five decades, with substantial inconsistency in both research methods and conclusions, ranging 
from findings of greater sentence severity for black and Latino defendants to findings of apparent 
Liberation Hypothesis and Three Strikes 
 4 
leniency towards defendants from the same groups (Albonetti, 1991).  Recent work by 
Steffensmeier, Ulmer, and Kramer (1998) finds that race, gender, and age have both independent 
and interactive effects on sentencing outcomes, with defendants who are young, black, and male 
experiencing the most negative outcomes.  The authors conclude that judges’ sentencing 
decisions are mostly based on “legally relevant variables” such as offense severity and prior 
record, but these decisions are also influenced by their assessment of the offenders with regard to 
three main “focal concerns”: “blameworthiness” and harm done to the victim, “dangerousness” 
of the offender, and “practical constraints and consequences,” including a wide range of factors 
from courtroom workgroup dynamics to “local politics and community norms” (Steffensmeier, 
Ulmer, & Kramer, 1998).  Steffensmeier and his co-authors suggest that judges’ assessments of 
these focal concerns could be influenced by stereotypes and expectations associated with 
defendant characteristics such as race, gender, and age, and their empirical findings support this 
idea.   
I hypothesize that similar dynamics influence both Three Strikes sentencing outcomes 
and, more broadly, felony sentences in California.  Not only are race, gender, and age likely to 
influence judges’ decisions, but these factors are also likely to affect charging decisions made by 
prosecutors.  Although both judges and prosecutors have legal authority to exercise discretion in 
the application of Three Strikes, mandatory sentencing policies tend to shift the power to make 
sentencing decisions from judges to prosecutors (Greenwood et al., 1998; Kieso, 2005; Miethe, 
1987; Misner, 1996; Ricciardulli, 2002; Zimring, Kamin, & Hawkins, 1999).  In Three Strikes 
cases, prosecutorial discretion is particularly important because the sentence associated with a 
third-strike charge is extremely long and not negotiable.  
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The adoption and implementation of “Three Strikes and You’re Out” in California has 
been described as “the largest penal experiment in American history” (Zimring et al., 1999).  
This vast sentencing reform provides an unusual opportunity to test leading theories on the use of 
prosecutorial discretion and the impacts of extralegal factors in the determination of sentencing 
outcomes.  The data collected for this study make it possible to conduct rigorous empirical 
analyses to support or refute the widely-asserted belief that discretion in the application of Three 
Strikes is exercised to the disadvantage of certain groups, particularly African Americans or 
Latinos.  Analysis of individual-level data will represent a significant improvement over existing 
analyses primarily based on aggregate statistics (Ehlers et al., 2004; Kieso, 2005).   
Prosecutorial Discretion and Mandatory Minimums 
Mandatory minimum laws like “Three Strikes and You’re Out” are clearly intended to 
restrict the amount of discretion, especially leniency, allowable in the sentencing of repeat 
offenders.  How, then, is it possible for Three Strikes be applied more aggressively against 
certain defendants?  The answer may lie in the “wiggle room” that remains for prosecutorial and 
judicial discretion in the law’s application.   
 “In the furtherance of justice,” a prosecuting attorney may file a motion to dismiss one or 
more prior convictions that would otherwise count as strikes, thus sparing a defendant the 
mandatory third-strike sentence of 25 years to life if convicted (Legislative Analyst's Office, 
2005).3  District Attorneys, who are county-level elected officials in California, retain the legal 
authority to determine guidelines and policies regarding the circumstances under which attorneys 
in their offices charge eligible cases as third strikes or petition the court to waive prior offenses 
(Bowers, 2001; California Legislative Analyst's Office, 2005; Olson, 2000).  Discretion may also 
be exercised by prosecutors or judges to charge certain offenses known as “wobblers” as either 
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felonies (which trigger Three Strikes) or misdemeanors (which, in sharp contrast, carry a 
maximum sentence of one year in jail), or to charge multiple counts, including strikes, from a 
single incident (Legislative Analyst's Office, 2005; Ricciardulli, 2002).   
 Liberation Hypothesis and Sentencing Disparities for Different Offense Types  
There are numerous reasons to believe that racial and ethnic sentencing disparities may 
be greater for certain criminal offenses than for others.  Several criminal justice researchers have 
found that minorities are overarrested at higher rates for less serious nonviolent offenses than for 
serious or violent crimes, and that disproportionalities are greatest for drug offenses, including 
those associated with the “War on Drugs,” where there is more subjectivity in the process of 
searching or arresting suspects or filing charges (Barnes & Kingsnorth, 1996; Beckett, Nysop, & 
Pfingst, 2006; Blumstein, 1983, 1993; Klein, Petersilia, & Turner, 1990; Miller, 1996; Petersilia, 
1983; Tonry, 1995).  According to the “liberation hypothesis,” originally set forth by Kalven and 
Zeisel (1966), jurors in a criminal trial are more likely to deviate from the facts of a case, and 
therefore allow their decisions to be influenced by personal opinions or values, when the 
evidence against the defendant is less conclusive, i.e. when they are “liberated” from legal 
constraints such as convincing eyewitness testimony, a recovered firearm, clear injury to the 
victim, extreme heinousness of the offense, or similar factors that, if present, would reduce 
ambiguity regarding the appropriate verdict (Kalven & Zeisel, 1966; Reskin & Visher, 1986; 
Spohn & Cederblom, 1991; Walker, Spohn, & DeLone, 1996).  Penalties are relatively clearly 
defined for serious and violent offenses, but for lesser crimes, less consensus exists regarding 
appropriate levels of punishment; therefore there is more potential for juror discretion, which 
may include consideration of “legally irrelevant factors such as race” (Spohn & Cederblom, 
1991; Walker et al., 1996).  “Wobblers,” discussed above, fall into the latter category of crimes 
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due to the considerable legal latitude involved in the process of filing charges.  In their 1991 
study using data from Michigan, Spohn and Cederblom found that black defendants were 
sentenced more harshly than whites for assault, but not for more serious offenses such as murder, 
robbery, and rape.  This paper seeks to examine whether the same dynamic holds true in 
California, even under a mandatory minimum policy like Three Strikes, which presumably limits 
flexibility, and might therefore leave less room for arbitrariness or discrimination in sentencing.  
Summary of Hypotheses 
In light of the background, theory, and hypotheses presented above, this investigation 
seeks to test the following hypotheses: 
 H1:  Because they are associated with certain “focal concerns,” demographic 
characteristics of defendants, such as race, ethnicity, age, and gender, are likely to 
influence Three Strikes sentencing outcomes.  The analysis will examine whether the 
effects of these factors on Three Strikes sentences consistent with those found in previous 
studies of sentencing, such as those by Steffensmeier and his colleagues (Demuth & 
Steffensmeier, 2004; Steffensmeier et al., 1998).  Because a defendant’s demographic 
traits play a role in the assessment of “focal concerns,” I hypothesize that observed racial 
and ethnic disparities in third-strikes sentences will be reduced, but not entirely 
eliminated, when “legally relevant” control variables, such as prior record and offense 
severity, are introduced in the analysis.   
 H2:  The liberation hypothesis predicts that disparities will vary by offense, with 
defendants’ extralegal characteristics more likely to influence charging decisions for 
offenses whose penalties are less clearly agreed-upon.  Racial and ethnic minorities may 
therefore be more likely than whites to be charged as felons for “wobblers” (i.e. crimes 
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which may be charged as either felonies or misdemeanors).  By the same token, there will 
also be greater observed disparity between racial and ethnic groups in Three Strikes 
sentencing for non-violent offenders than for violent offenders. 
 
Data and Methods 
Offender-level Data 
 
 The analysis is conducted on data obtained by special request from the California 
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) in September 2006.  The first dataset 
includes individual-level records for all 171,163 felony offenders housed in the California prison 
system on August 31, 2006.  The following variables are included in each record:   
 Defendant’s race 
 Ethnicity (Hispanic origin) 
 Sex 
 Age 
 Commitment county 
 Current offense(s)  
 Probation or parole status 
 Sentence length 
 2-strikes or 3-strikes sentence 
  
The CDCR dataset has some limitations.  It includes inmates who received a prison 
sentence, but not those who received jail terms, probation, drug treatment, or other alternative 
sentences.  Because of this, it does not include records for defendants whose “wobbler” offenses 
were charged as misdemeanors, or those charged with felonies who were not convicted.  Data on 
dropped or reduced charges, which have been found to be important and sometimes to vary by 
race (Adams & Cutshall, 1987; Albonetti, 1987, 1992), are not available from this source.  To 
my knowledge, there is no centralized database available to the public that contains a large 
sample of individual-level cases from arrest through sentencing in California.  These data would 
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have to be obtained from the courts or created by matching police arrest files to court records and 
inmate files; this is outside the scope of this study. 
Wobblers and Non-wobblers 
The data include the records for “wobbler” offenders who were charged with felonies, 
convicted, and sent to prison.  Of the 532 separate offense codes included in the dataset, 143 are 
“wobblers,” meaning that the prescribed penalty under California's sentencing guidelines 
includes either a prison term or an alternate sentence of a jail term, a fine, or a combination of 
the two (Judicial Council of California, 2007).  As discussed above, the charging decision for 
these types of offenses is significant, because the decision to file a “wobbler” as a misdemeanor 
rather than as a felony can spare a defendant with one or more prior serious or violent 
convictions either the mandatory doubled second-strike sentence or the mandatory third-strike 
sentence of 25 years to life in prison.  Offenses that do not fall under the “wobbler” description 
are referred to in this paper as “non-wobblers;” these crimes must be always charged as felonies, 
and therefore will always lead to second- or third-strikes sentences for eligible offenders upon 
conviction.  The offense codes in the dataset have been coded as wobblers or non-wobblers, 
based on the sentences prescribed in the California Penal Code, Health and Safety Code, 
Business and Professions Code, Vehicle Code, Welfare and Revenue Code, Harbor and 
Navigations Code, Insurance Code, Revenue and Taxation Code, Government Code, Civil Code, 
or Corporations Code.  All of the inmates whose records are in the dataset were convicted of 
felonies.  Thirty-two percent of the inmates were sent to prison after being convicted of a 
wobbler offense charged as a felony rather than as a misdemeanor; the remaining sixty-eight 
percent were sentenced for non-wobblers. 
Methods 
Liberation Hypothesis and Three Strikes 
 10 
The preliminary analyses reported in this paper employ logistic models with a dummy 
variable representing the presence or absence of a third-strike sentence as the primary dependent 
variable.  The primary independent variables of interest are the dummy variables associated with 
the mutually exclusive race/ethnicity categories, African-American, Hispanic/Latino, white, 
Asian, American Indian, and “other.”  Other demographic variables included in the model 
include those representing gender, immigrant status, and age (six categories).  Control variables 
include parole status (dummy variables representing new offense, parole violation, and parole 
hearing pending), offense type (thirty-six mutually exclusive categories), number of prior serious 
offenses, and number of prior violent offenses.  Selected summary statistics are presented in 
Table 2 below. 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
As shown in Table 2 above, counties are categorized and coded based on the type of 
internal policy (if any) the District Attorney has implemented regarding the treatment of second- 
and third-strikes eligible cases.  An indicator representing county-level policy is constructed 
using information gathered from interviews with representatives from the local District 
Attorneys’ offices, examination of position papers or public statements published in the print 
media, other publications, or online sources, and interviews with representatives from County 
Public Defenders’ offices if no information can be obtained from the DA.  This step tests the 
hypothesis that extralegal factors such as a defendant’s race or ethnicity will have greater 
influence on the assessment of “focal concerns” by prosecutors in jurisdictions that permit the 
highest degree of prosecutorial discretion.   
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Findings and Discussion 
 Table 3 below compares the results of two logistic regression models.  The first model 
includes several demographic measures: race/ethnicity, immigrant status, sex, and age.  Trial 
county is also included.  This model produces statistically significant odds ratio estimates 
indicating that African-Americans have 1.85 times greater odds of receiving third strike 
sentences than whites, and American Indians have 1.42 times higher odds of receiving third 
strike sentences than whites.  Individuals born outside the United States have significantly lower 
odds of receiving third strike sentences than native-born offenders (odds ratio = 0.63).  Men face 
much higher odds than women of receiving Three Strikes sentences, with an odds ratio of 9.25 
attached to the dummy variable for Male. 
Adding a set of legally relevant variables to the model – number of serious and violent 
prior convictions, parole status, and offense category (36 categories coded as dummy variables, 
not displayed in Table 3) – greatly enhances the explanatory power of the model, with the r-
squared value increasing from 0.09 to 0.31.  Not surprisingly, all of these additional variables, 
which represent the factors that are supposed to be considered in the sentencing process, are 
highly statistically significant (p < 0.001).  In addition, the inclusion of legally relevant variables 
reduces the observed racial/ethnic disparities, shrinking the odds ratio associated with Black 
from 1.85 to 1.47.  The odds ratio associated with American Indian decreases only slightly, from 
1.42 to 1.40, and the ratio associated with immigrant status moves closer to 1.  The odds ratio for 
Latino ethnicity is slightly less than 1 in both models, and it is significant when the legally 
relevant variables are controlled.  The Male odds ratio falls substantially with the legally relevant 
controls, but men still face 5.05 times higher odds than women of being sentenced under Three 
Strikes.  The “immigrant effect” is also tempered, with the associated odds ratio increasing from 
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0.63 to 0.76.  Although the odds ratios associated with several demographic traits grow smaller 
when legally relevant factors are controlled, it is notable that they remain significant, and in 
many cases, substantial in size.  
These findings confirm the first hypothesis, which predicted that demographic 
characteristics would exert an influence on Three Strikes sentencing even with legally relevant 
variables controlled, due to the role of these characteristics in the assessment of “focal concerns” 
by decision-makers in the criminal justice system, such as prosecutors, judges, or juries.  
However, it is interesting to observe that Latinos and members of other minority groups do not 
appear to experience the same consistent disadvantage with regard to sentencing that African-
Americans do, and immigrants seem to receive consistently lighter sentences than native-born 
offenders.   
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Table 4 below displays the results of a test of Hypothesis 2.  Two logistic regression 
models are estimated, using separate subsets of the data.  The analysis is performed first on the 
cases for which the current conviction was for a “wobbler” offense, and then on the “non-
wobbler” cases.   The results show that the disparity between African-Americans and whites in 
Three Strikes sentencing is greater for wobbler offenses (odds ratio = 1.56) than it is for non-
wobbler offenses (odds ratio = 1.44).  Furthermore, there appears to be disparity in favor of 
Latinos when their offenses are wobblers (odds ratio = 0.76), but there is no statistically 
significant difference in odds between Latinos and whites for non-wobblers.  In contrast, the 
interaction term representing Latino*immigrant has an odds ratio of 1.56 and is significant at p < 
0.05 in the wobblers model, but is closer to 1 and not statistically significant in the non-wobblers 
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model.  The odds ratios associated with the American Indian dummy variable are close in 
magnitude to those for African-Americans, but significant only in the non-wobbler analysis.  
Like the analyses shown in Table 3, these analyses show that men have about 5 times higher 
odds than women of receiving Three Strikes sentences; this is the case regardless of whether the 
current conviction is for a wobbler or non-wobbler. 
These findings are consistent with Hypothesis 2, which predicts that sentencing 
disparities will be greater for offenses whose associated penalties are less clearly defined (e.g. 
wobblers), than for offenses for which there is more consensus regarding appropriate 
punishments (e.g. non-wobblers).     
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
To further test Hypothesis 2, another set of models is compared.  Table 5 below displays 
the results of three separate logistic regression models, run on subsets of the data according to 
offense type: violent, property, or drug.   
The liberation hypothesis would predict that racial and ethnic disparities in sentencing 
would be greater for less serious offenses (i.e. property and drug crimes) than for violent 
offenses, and the results of the analysis are consistent with this prediction.  The odds ratio 
associated with the dummy variable Black is 1.35 in the violent offender analysis, but higher – 
1.76 and 1.52, respectively – in the property and drug offender analyses.  This finding is similar 
to those of Spohn and Cederblom (1991).  Consistent with the findings of the analyses 
summarized in the previous two tables, an apparent disparity in favor of Latinos is present (odds 
ratio = 0.86) and statistically significant in the violent offender analysis.  However, the odds ratio 
is closer to 1 and not significant in analyses of the property and drug offender subsets.  This runs 
counter to the hypothesis that racial/ethnic disparities (in either the positive or negative direction) 
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will be greatest for the least severe offenses.  The findings for Latinos born outside the United 
States are more consistent with the liberation hypothesis.  The odds ratio on the 
Latino*Immigrant interaction term are greatest and statistically significant in the property crime 
model (odds ratio = 1.66, p < 0.05), but closer to 1 and not significant in the other two models.  
The odds ratio associated with the variable Male remains consistent (ranging from 5.11 to 5.32) 
and significant (p < .001) in the models for all three crime categories. 
 
Conclusions and Policy Implications  
The preceding analyses tested a set of hypotheses based on focal concerns theory and the 
liberation hypothesis.  Consistent with the findings of prior investigations of sentencing 
disparities, the analysis indicates that disparities in Three Strikes sentencing outcomes are 
present, even when several key legally relevant variables are controlled.  African-American 
offenders appear to be significantly more likely than whites to receive third-strike sentences, 
even when the nature of the offense, the defendant’s prior record, and parole status are 
controlled.  The same is true for American Indians.  The disparity between male and female 
offenders in Three Strikes sentencing is even greater than that between blacks and whites.  This 
is likely a result of the assessment of “focal concerns” such as “dangerousness” of the offender 
(female felons may be considered less of a threat to society than male felons), “practical 
constraints and consequences” such as limited capacity in women’s correctional facilities or 
concerns about finding appropriate caregivers for the women’s custodial children, or 
“blameworthiness,” especially for women who may have been provoked or abused 
(Steffensmeier, Kramer, & Streifel, 1993; Steffensmeier et al., 1998).   
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A notable and perhaps unexpected finding is that Latino offenders experience sentencing 
disparities, but to their advantage rather than disadvantage.  Where significant effects were 
detected for immigrant status, these were also in the form of lower odds of a Three Strikes 
sentence.  These observations may indicate leniency in the sentencing of Latinos and foreign-
born defendants.  An alternative explanation is that substantial portions of these groups are 
deported either before or after they are convicted, leaving fewer repeat offenders in the prison 
population.  While the explanation merits further examination, one important conclusion to draw 
from these findings is that African-Americans and Latinos do not experience the same 
disadvantage in the sentencing process; therefore, it is instructive to look beyond a black-and-
white typology when studying the role of race and ethnicity in the justice system.  
The liberation hypothesis receives support from the outcomes of the analyses.  Disparities 
between blacks and whites are found to be wider in the sentencing of wobbler offenses than for 
non-wobblers, and the black-white sentencing gap is also greater for property or drug offenses 
than for violent crimes.  These findings are consistent with those of past studies indicating that 
extralegal factors are more likely to influence juries when the offense in question is less serious.  
In the case of Three Strikes, the implications of a third-strike sentence for a wobbler are 
enormous.  A wobbler charged as a misdemeanor will receive a sentence of one year in jail or 
less, and the standard, non-strikes sentence for most wobbler offenses is about 24 months in 
prison, which would be doubled to 48 months for a second-striker.  However, a third-strike 
wobbler conviction carries a mandatory 25-to-life prison term.  Thus, the presence of 
inappropriate disparities in Three Strikes sentencing for cases like these is especially disturbing.   
Perhaps the most controversial aspect of Three Strikes has been the eligibility of 
nonviolent offenders for mandatory prison terms of 25 years to life under the law.  Critics of 
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Three Strikes argue that the law’s inclusion of all felons with “strikes,” rather than a narrow class 
of offenders, violates the legal principle of proportionality for crimes and punishments (Kieso, 
2005; Zimring, Hawkins, & Kamin, 2001).  The analyses above indicate that a different form of 
injustice may be present in the law’s application towards nonviolent criminals: it is among 
property and drug offenders that the greatest disparities between black and white offenders are 
observed.  This finding is consistent with the liberation hypothesis. 
Even in the application of a mandatory minimum sentencing policy in a determinate 
sentencing state, racial sentencing disparities appear to persist.  In California, the Three Strikes 
law still does appear to be disproportionately applied against African-American defendants.  To 
the extent that disparities in sentencing outcomes result from decisions made, consciously or 
unintentionally, by participants and authorities in the criminal justice system, it may be possible 
to mitigate or prevent discriminatory applications of the law.  Determination of the extent of the 
problem and potential points for intervention may lead to closer examination of policies and 
practices in certain agencies, which could in turn result in improved efforts to ensure fairness in 
the administration of laws like Three Strikes.  The reduction of racial disparities in sentencing 
policies could have enormous effects on the lives of sentenced individuals and their families, as 
well as the communities from which black inmates originate and to which most of them will 
eventually return.  In a society where black men face a 29 percent chance of incarceration during 
their lifetime, more black male dropouts are imprisoned than employed, and 7 percent of all 
African-American children have an incarcerated parent (Bonczar & Beck, 1997; Travis & 
Petersilia, 2001), progress in the understanding, reduction, and prevention of sentencing 
disparities between African-Americans and whites is long overdue. 
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NOTES 
 
1 The author wishes to thank Alexander Friedman for research assistance and the Santa Clara 
University Faculty-Student Research Assistant Program for support for this project. 
 
2 Laws called “Three Strikes and You’re Out” also exist in twenty-three other states and at the 
federal level, but they are considerably narrower in scope, application, cost, and societal impact 
than California’s law; all three offenses must be serious or violent felonies in order to qualify for 
Three Strikes sentencing in most jurisdictions other than California (Clark, Austin, & Henry, 
1997). 
 
3 A California Supreme Court ruling in the 1996 case People v. Superior Court (Romero) 
determined that judges could exercise the same discretion, though some legal scholars have 
concluded that this power has seldom been exercised (Ricciardulli, 2002; Vitiello, 1997a, 
1997b). 
 
4 Sources: State population data from United States Census Bureau Population Division (2005), 
Table 4: Estimates of the Population by Race and Hispanic or Latino Origin for the United States 
and States: July 1, 2005; all other statistics in this table calculated using August 31, 2006 inmate 
population data provided by the CA Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. 
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Table 1: Racial Composition of California Population, Prison Inmates, and “Strikers”4 
 
  White  Black Latino Asian & 
Pacific 
Islander 
American 
Indian 
Other 
Race 
% of CA population 43.8 6.2 35.2 12.3 0.5 2.0 
% of all inmates 27.7 28.7 38.2 1.0 0.9 3.6 
% of 2nd strikers 25.8 34.3 35.7 0.7 0.8 2.6 
% of 3rd strikers 25.1 44.4 26.7 0.5 0.9 2.3 
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Table 2: CDCR Dataset Summary Statistics 
 
 Percent 
Race/Ethnicity Asian 0.96 
 Black/African-American 28.7 
 Hispanic/Latino 38.2 
 American Indian 0.95 
 Other 3.6 
  White 27.7 
Place of Birth United States 83.6 
 Outside the U.S. 16.4 
Gender Male 93.3 
  Female 6.7 
Age 14 to 24 26.8 
 25 to 34 33.6 
 35 to 44 26.0 
 45 to 54 11.0 
 55 to 64 2.1 
  65 and up 0.4 
Current Parole Admission 62.9 
Return Status Parole violator with new term 24.8 
 Parole violator - return to custody 9.0 
  Pending revocation 3.3 
Offense  Violent 50.3 
Category Property 21.3 
(General) Drug 20.6 
  Other 7.7 
Offense Type Non-wobbler 67.9 
 Wobbler 32.1 
Highest  None 73.2 
Strike Count 2 Strikes 21.7 
  3 Strikes 5.1 
N   171,163 
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Table 4: Comparison of Outcomes for Wobblers and Non-Wobblers 
DV = Three-Strikes Sentence 
 
 Wobbler Offenses Non-Wobblers 
  
Odds 
Ratio 
Std. 
Err. P>z 
Odds 
Ratio 
Std. 
Err. P>z 
Black 1.53 0.09 0.000 1.44 0.06 0.000 
Latino 0.76 0.05 0.000 1.01 0.05 0.784 
Asian 1.70 0.75 0.230 0.98 0.34 0.951 
American Indian 1.37 0.30 0.152 1.45 0.24 0.024 
Other race 0.74 0.14 0.121 1.17 0.13 0.158 
(Reference = White)             
Born Outside the US 0.77 0.14 0.137 0.76 0.09 0.015 
Latino and born outside the US 1.56 0.31 0.029 1.03 0.13 0.819 
Asian and born outside the US 0.28 0.20 0.081 1.05 0.46 0.904 
Male 5.04 0.93 0.000 5.10 0.76 0.000 
(Reference = female)             
Age 14-24 0.25 0.04 0.000 0.29 0.02 0.000 
Age 25-34 1.39 0.11 0.000 0.99 0.05 0.856 
Age 35-44 1.66 0.12 0.000 1.35 0.07 0.000 
(Reference = Age 45-54)         
Age 55-64 1.19 0.19 0.268 0.84 0.10 0.161 
Ages 65 and up 2.37 0.79 0.010 1.36 0.32 0.181 
Number of serious priors 1.88 0.04 0.000 1.65 0.02 0.000 
Number of violent priors 1.86 0.03 0.000 1.76 0.02 0.000 
Parole violator - new term 1.20 0.06 0.000 1.63 0.05 0.000 
Parole violator - return to custody 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.00 0.005 
Parole violator - pending revocation      0.00 0.00 0.000 
(Reference = non-parolee admission)             
(Offense category dummies omitted)           
Individual county dummies omitted             
N   51418     114693     
LR chi2 6585.6    14759.5    
D.F. 85    100    
Prob > chi2 0.000    0.000    
Pseudo R2  0.316    0.309    
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Table 3: Logistic Model with and without Legally Relevant Variables   
Dependent Variable = Three-Strikes Sentence 
 
 
Without Legally Relevant 
Vars 
With Legally Relevant 
Vars 
 
Odds 
Ratio Std. Err. P>z 
Odds 
Ratio 
Std. 
Err. P>z 
Black 1.85 0.055 0.000 1.47 0.051 0.000 
Latino 0.98 0.034 0.503 0.93 0.036 0.048 
Asian 1.00 0.252 1.000 1.16 0.318 0.579 
American Indian 1.42 0.168 0.003 1.40 0.183 0.011 
Other race 1.05 0.092 0.558 1.04 0.101 0.675 
(Reference = White)             
Born Outside the US 0.63 0.053 0.000 0.76 0.073 0.005 
Latino and born outside the US 0.97 0.094 0.728 1.15 0.125 0.196 
Asian and born outside the US 1.01 0.331 0.975 0.76 0.276 0.456 
(Reference = US-born)       
Male 9.25 1.015 0.000 5.05 0.587 0.000 
(Reference = female)             
Age 14-24 0.16 0.009 0.000 0.30 0.019 0.000 
Age 25-34 0.89 0.032 0.001 1.11 0.049 0.015 
Age 35-44 1.45 0.051 0.000 1.45 0.061 0.000 
(Reference = Age 45-54)          
Age 55-64 0.84 0.068 0.033 0.96 0.093 0.689 
Ages 65 and up 1.03 0.170 0.869 1.58 0.297 0.016 
Number of serious priors       1.73 0.018 0.000 
Number of violent priors     1.80 0.017 0.000 
Parole violator - new term     1.45 0.039 0.000 
Parole violator - return to custody     0.00 0.000 0.000 
Parole violator - pending revocation     0.00 0.001 0.000 
(Reference = non-parolee admission)             
(Offense category dummies omitted)          
(County dummies omitted)             
N   170861     169553     
LR chi2 6266.2   21328.8    
D.F. 66   105    
Prob > chi2 0.000   0.000    
Pseudo R2  0.091   0.309    
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Table 5: Comparison of Outcomes by Offense Group; DV = Three-Strikes Sentence 
 
 Violent Offenses Property Offenses Drug Offenses 
 Odds Ratio Std. Err. P>z Odds Ratio Std. Err. P>z Odds Ratio 
Std. 
Err. P>z 
Black 1.35 0.07 0.000 1.76 0.12 0.000 1.52 0.14 0.000 
Latino 0.86 0.05 0.008 0.94 0.07 0.421 1.16 0.11 0.132 
Asian 0.70 0.31 0.417 2.93 1.19 0.008 0.00 0.00 0.000 
American Indian 1.18 0.21 0.345 1.27 0.39 0.432 3.09 0.96 0.000 
Other race 1.01 0.14 0.937 1.02 0.20 0.909 1.26 0.33 0.384 
(Reference = White)              
Born Outside the US 0.72 0.10 0.015 0.83 0.15 0.306 0.89 0.23 0.654 
Latino and born outside the US 0.98 0.15 0.914 1.66 0.34 0.015 1.13 0.32 0.671 
Asian and born outside the US 1.20 0.65 0.733 0.23 0.16 0.039 dropped     
Male 5.32 1.13 0.000 5.11 0.94 0.000 5.27 1.31 0.000 
(Reference = female)              
Age 14-24 0.27 0.02 0.000 0.22 0.04 0.000 0.25 0.07 0.000 
Age 25-34 0.80 0.05 0.001 1.40 0.12 0.000 1.65 0.17 0.000 
Age 35-44 1.15 0.07 0.024 1.73 0.14 0.000 1.82 0.18 0.000 
(Reference = Age 45-54)              
Age 55-64 1.17 0.15 0.212 0.74 0.17 0.177 0.77 0.19 0.298 
Ages 65 and up 1.28 0.30 0.294 2.08 0.88 0.085 1.09 0.81 0.905 
Number of serious priors 1.78 0.03 0.000 1.75 0.03 0.000 1.58 0.04 0.000 
Number of violent priors 1.75 0.02 0.000 1.88 0.04 0.000 1.73 0.03 0.000 
Parole violator - new term 1.75 0.07 0.000 1.30 0.07 0.000 1.32 0.09 0.000 
Parole violator - return to custody 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.00 0.000 dropped    
Parole violator - pending revocation dropped   dropped   0.02 0.02 0.000 
(Reference = non-parolee admission)                
Offense category dummies omitted                   
County dummies omitted              
N   83914     34055     30251     
LR chi2 (D.F.) 10428.0 (82)   5920.7 (72)  2614.6  (64)   
Prob > chi2 0.000    0.000   0.000    
Pseudo R2  0.307    0.339   0.244    
 
